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COMMENTARIES
GREEK LEGAL HISTORY-
ITS FUNCTIONS AND POTENTIALITIES*
HANS JULIUS WOLFF**
I
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to you about my spe-
cialty, the history of the Greek law in antiquity. Ancient Greek law-
to name the utter limits of the subject-is the law that was observed
by Greek-speaking people from the time of Homer' through the clas-
sical era (mainly the law of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries
B.C.) to the Hellenistic times (the laws of the Macedonian-Greek
monarchies carved out of Alexander's empire in Egypt, Syria, and else-
where, including the forms they took after these countries were in-
corporated into the Roman Empire).
To the average lawyer, Greek legal history is an absolute terra in-
cognita. Even those who are interested in the history of the law, and,
I am sorry to say, even most of the Romanists, are not prepared to grant
Greek legal history a greater value than perhaps that of a nice hobby,
for which of course the man who is busy with legal work has no time.
Worse than that, I have to admit that such feelings are not entirely
unjustified. For it is true that ancient Greek law has had only a very
slight impact on the legal systems of our time. Even the civil law of
Greece until some decades ago was based on the so-called Basilica, a
paraphrase of Justinian's compilation of Roman law, and is now shaped
broadly after the pattern of the German Civil Code. Only a few
scattered institutions of ancient Greek law have found their way into
modem systems. Examples are the law of jettison and rules concern-
ing illegitimate children that were incorporated in late Roman legisla-
tion and, in a modified form, are still found in the codes of some of
* The text of this Commentary is based on a lecture delivered at Washington Uni-
versity School of Law on February 14, 1975, and at Wayne State University Law School
on November 4, 1974.
** Professor Emeritus of Roman and Civil Law, University of Freiburg, Germany.
Dr.iur., 1932, University of Berlin; Dr.iur.h.c., 1972, University of Athens.
1. The eighth century B.C., more or less.
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the Latin countries in Europe and South America. Some of the
methods of notarial documentation that are still in use also had their
origin in the Hellenistic period. Beyond that, however, there is little
that our laws owe directly or indirectly to ancient Greek law, as far
as positive institutions are concerned-in contradiction of course, to le-
gal philosophy, which exerted more influence; but with this I am not
here concerned. I said "indirectly;" by this I am referring to recent
research into the so-called postclassical development of the Roman law.
That research has established-in contrast, it is true, to what Romanists
thought forty or fifty years ago-that legislation and legal literature in
the period beginning with Constantine were not characterized by
wholesale -incorporation of ideas originating in the eastern lands of the
Empire, in particular, in its Greek parts.
Given this situation, the historian of Greek law is obliged to explain
why he feels that from the standpoint of general jurisprudence the study
of Greek law has a function and value. By this I mean an interest
reaching beyond a merely pragmatic, antiquarian interest in the past.
Ascertaining what existed is a necessary and important task, for it pro-
vides us with the indispensable basis from which we can try to interpret
the facts from a legal point of view. But unlike the philological schol-
ars, many of whom, in the 19th and 20th centuries, have done research
into Greek legal history (and some of them have produced excellent
work2), the jurist must try to understand the facts from the standpoint
of juridical doctrine and try to discover the religious, political, social,
and economic conditions forming the background of, and often provid-
ing an explanation for, institutions which at first sight may look rather
strange to us. Insofar as we succeed in this, we shall indeed be in
a position to serve an important purpose of general jurisprudence, be-
cause we can contribute to the overall knowledge of how law grows
and what factors cause and promote this growth.
This is what I wish to discuss today. It involves the problems of
what Greek legal history can achieve and where its limits are, and, at
the same time, what methods and approaches will achieve results and
what methods and approaches should be avoided.3
2. Suffice it to mention the most recent work, which is A.R.W. HARIuSON, Tim
LAW OF ATHNS (1971), in two volumes, the first of which is THE FAMILY AND PRO-
ERTY, and the second, PRocEDu . The treatise, unfortunately unfinished at the author's
death, is highly informative, though not entirely satisfactory from the legal point of
view.
3. For a brief summary of the Greek legal system, see Wolff, Griechisches Recht,
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II
Let me begin with the last question. It is in the nature of the
sources at our disposal-literary sources, primarily Athenian rhetors of
the fourth century B.C., inscriptions on stone, and, for Hellenistic law,
thousands of Greek papyrus documents from Egypt-that they show
us the law in action in the form of statutes, court pleas, petitions, con-
tracts, and the like. There is, however, no legal literature in the tech-
nical sense of the word, for, peculiarly, the nation that first developed
scientific interests and methods never felt the urge to analyze its own
laws. It left to us the task of finding dogmatic categories that will help
us to classify and possibly to systematize the phenomena. In the nine-
teenth century, scholars tried, understandably enough, to use for this
purpose the concepts the Pandectists had distilled from the sources of
the Roman law, and which on the European continent were considered
the absolute and eternal substrate of every legal system; this was, to
name only the most conspicuous example, the approach used by L.
Beauchet in his four-volume work, published in 1897, on the private
law of the Athenian republic.4 Today we know that the Romanist ap-
proach often blocks rather than opens access to the notions upon which
the Greeks shaped their institutions, methods, and forms. This is not
to deny that Romanist terms often can be helpful in making Greek
legal phenomena more easily understandable to our own minds; but
we should never try to impute them to the Greeks themselves. Their
categories were not those of the Romans, and neglect of this fact has
often led to the result that explanations and identifications, suggested
by modern scholars, not only conflict with the language of the sources,
but even distort anachronistically the picture of the instutitions or ways
of legal thinking under discussion. For example, the Greeks did not
know the strict forms of contract of the Romans. It has been estab-
lished nevertheless that the Greeks did not derive the contractual obli-
gation from the mere agreement of the parties in the manner of the
Roman consensual contract, as was the general belief until recently.
Rather, to them, the source of the obligation was some real act of dis-
in LExicoN DER ALTEN WELT 2516 (1965). A shorter version of this survey, in
English, appeared in 8 ENCYCLOPEDA BRrrANNiCA, Greek Law, 398-402 (1975). Older
and partially obsolete works are J.W. JONEs, ThE LAw AND LEGAL THEORY OF THE
GREEKS: AN INTRODUCTION (1956); 2 P. VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURIs-
PRUDENCE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE GREEK CrrY (1922).
4. L. BEAUCHET, ISTOiRE Du DRorr pP,VE DE LA RaPuBLIQurE ATHLNmNm (1897).
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posal, normally on the part of the creditor and not quite dissimilar to
common law consideration, pursuant to which the debtor had under-
taken to pay or do something. Likewise, the Greeks did not distin-
guish in the manner of the Romans between actio in rem and actio
in personam, nor did they-in spite of an utterance of Aristotle's that
seems to support this view5-acknowledge the summa divisio made by
GaiusO between obligationes ex delicto and obligationes ex contractu.
To sum up, we have to start from the supposition that the ancient
Greeks possessed a set of legal precepts of their own and that it is our
task to bring these to light. The first to show how this can and should
be done were two great legal historians, Ernst Rabel and Joseph
Partsch.
The foregoing observation may have sounded like a truism, and it
would be one if it hadn't been neglected for so long. Let us now con-
sider what it means in terms of practical potentialities of research.
What kind of problems follows from it? To answer this question we
have to realize certain limits drawn by the very nature of our subject.
We are faced at once with the fundamental fact which I have men-
tioned already, the absence of a Greek legal science. Never did
Greeks-for reasons which I cannot discuss here7-- attempt to pene-
trate the background, essence, or implications of their institutions.
No work was ever written that sought to elucidate those institutions'
practical consequences by using a case method analogous to that of the
Romans. There was not even an attempt-which might have been
more congenial to the Greek mind-to produce a systematic survey of
the law by means of dialectical analysis. It is true that the forensic
orator had to be familiar with the statutory law; there was some study
of it in the rhetorical schools of fourth century Athens, and probably
elsewhere. There was also a certain amount of discussion of legal
problems in the philosophical literature from the sophists to Aristotle
and his pupils. But all this has little to do with real jurisprudence.
5. Cf. ARIsroTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHcs 1131a (I. Bekker transl. 1831). See
also H.J. WoLFF, Der Rechtshistoriker und die Privatrechtsdogmatik, in OPUSCULA
DISPERSA 41, 51 (1974) (discussing the fundamental difference between the statements
of Aristotle and Gains).
6. 3 GAius, INSTLTUTIONES § 88.
7. See L. WoLFF, Rechtsexperten in der griechischen Antike, in OPuscuLA
DIsPERSA 81-102 (1974).
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The rhetorical books that we have, of which the foremost is Aristotle's
Rhetoric, show that the rhetorical training was aimed at enabling the
orator to find convincing arguments, but not at making him thoroughly
familiar with the law for its own sake. Juridical arguments in philoso-
phical writings consisted of drafting schemes of utopian legislation, as
in Plato's Laws, or served as background material for the discussion
of the problems of justice and ethics; the outstanding example of this
kind of literature is Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. The only excep-
tions known to us, and probably the only ones that existed, were de-
scriptions of constitutions by Aristotle and his pupils (we possess Aris-
totle's Constitution of Athens) and a comparative survey of legal insti-
tutions written by Aristotle's pupil, Theophrastus, of which we have a
fragment. The Hellenistic period seems to have been even less inter-
ested in specifically legal studies than the classical period; the positivis-
tic work inaugurated by Aristotle and Theophrastus was never followed
up. There was no study of law in the great universities of the time,
such as those in Alexandria or Pergamon. The first jurists among the
Greeks were those who dealt with Roman law.
The effect of all this was that Greek states never saw a class of legal
experts of high standing. What came closest to it were the draftsmen
of legal documents, who were a typical feature of the Hellenistic era.
But they were no more than skilled technicians who knew the formulas
and were quite good at drawing up the contracts needed by the rather
highly developed economy. They were not in a position, however, to
work out refined principles concerning, for example, the formation and
validity of agreements or the treatment of negligence in the fulfillment
of contracts. Nor was there anything like a theory of bona fides in
obligations, a distinction between ownership and possession, or a hier-
archy of the various possible types of title to property (ownership, ease-
ments, and the like). Moreover, there is no evidence that the intellec-
tual level of advocates or judges was any higher than that of the drafts-
men. This is not to say that attempts at grasping the real meaning of
laws were entirely lacking. There seems to have been some discus-
sion of the sort among the Attic orators; I shall return to this point
shortly. But the fact remains that those were isolated instances and
by no means real symptoms of an organized effort to achieve a deeper
insight into the workings of the law.
This situation cannot help having consequences for our own study
of Greek and Hellenistic law or, rather, laws (for each of the numerous
Vol. 1975:395] 399
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states had its own set of statutes, courts, and institutions, which, of
course, differed from one another to some degree). Some authors did
try to discover in Greek forensic speeches, and even in the texts of
some contracts, sophisticated doctrines, the existence of which would
have entitled the Greek lawyers to be rated as equals of their col-
leagues in modem civilized countries. For instance, the Greek scholar
Themistokles Tsatsos8 sought to interpret a fourth century B.C. inscrip-
tion containing the text of a contract (between the Euboean city of Ere-
tria and a man who undertook to drain a huge swamp) to the effect
that it was based on the doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus in its
most modem version, comparable to the French theory of the faits
impr~vus or the German theory of Geschdftsgrundlage. In order to
reach this result, Tsatsos took it for granted that the Greek notion of
contract was the same as that of modem civil law-an agreement in-
volving enforceable mutual obligations of the parties. This, however,
was precisely wrong, because all a contract could provide for, consider-
ing the procedural possibilities of the time, was a liability for damages
caused by the frustration of expenses incurred in consideration of the
promise made by the other party. Consequently, there simply was no
room for adjustments such as Tsatsos assumed might have been made
when unforeseen developments called for changes.
It must be said, unfortunately, that expectations, nourished by Tsa-
tsos and others like him, are illusions. We cannot hope to find in the
sources of ancient Greek law the type of juridical thinking to which
we are accustomed. This means that, from the standpoint of method,
it is a mistake, leading nowhere, to approach those ancient sources with
concepts of our own, such as those that were developed in the conti-
nental countries of Europe by the Pandectistic science and grew in the
common law countries out of centuries of an ever refined judicial ex-
perience.
It is necessary to urge this caution precisely because we do find in
the Attic rhetors passages that show a remarkable skill in going beyond
the bare words of statutes and making out their real meaning and in-
tention (this occurred in cases involving the graphd paranomon, an
action devised to check the "constitutionality" of legislative propo-
8. TSATSOS, Der Chairephanesvertrag. Der Elnfluss unvorhergesehener Ereignisse
auf den Inhalt des Vertrages im antiken griechischen Recht, in SrrzuNGsBnElclrrn DER
AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHArEN Zu HEIDELBERG, PHiLosoPlsc--HISToIuSCHiE KLASSE,
No. 1 (1963); cf. Wolff, Book Review, 81 ZEnrrscH, r DER SAVIGNY STIFrTUN FOR
RE crsGEscucHTE, Romwmsrscim AB=TLUNG 340 (1964).
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sals). 9 As another step in the direction of true legal reasoning I may
mention an effort by the fourth century B.C. Athenian orator Hyper-
eides (in his speech against Athenogenes) to use the method of an-
alogy to draw an argument from a statute not immediately pertinent
to his case. There were probably other instances of the same sort, un-
known to us for lack of sources. Still, what is important is the fact
that these were exceptions. As a rule, Athenian courts and advocates
clung strictly to the words of the statutes, so that there was hardly any
room for an expanding or modifying interpretation of the laws. Dis-
cussions that indeed were going on in philosophical circles were im-
material as far as the daily practice was concerned. Modem attempts
to read into the sources of Athenian law something like a jurisprudence
of equity resulted from an optical illusion caused by philosophical
theories and by rhetorical tirades of orators and their play on emotions.
The same is true of Hellenistic jurisprudence. Occasional application
of equity principles was the result of exceptional intervention by mon-
archs or unsystematic arbitrariness of officials.10
IV
I have been dwelling at length on what I am afraid we have to call
the negative aspect of Greek law from the jurist's point of view. As
a matter of fact, there have been Romanists who brushed the Greek
law aside because they thought that a law without jurists could be no
more than a chaotic conglomeration of statutes, made ad hoc as the
need arose, devoid of any juridical interest. What then is the jurispru-
dential value of Greek legal history? Let me try to answer this ques-
tion by putting before you a selection of what I think are some of the
truly jurisprudential problems posed by the Greek law.
With the historians of some other laws of the past, such as the sys-
tems represented by the tablets or the Biblical law, as well as the old
Germanic and English laws, the historian of Greek law shares an ad-
vantage the Romanist is lacking. It is that he possesses contemporary
sources-the Homeric epics and Hesiod's poems-that allow him to ob-
9. Cf. WOLFF, "Normenkontrolle" und Gesetzesbegriff in der attischen Demokratie,
in SITZUNGSBERICHTE DER AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFrEN ZU HEIDELBERG, PHULosO-
PHmsCH-HISTOPISCHE KLASSE, No. 2 (1970).
10. Cf. H. MEYER-LAURIN, GESETz uND BILLIGKEIT Im ATrSCHEN PRoZESS (1965);
Meyer-Laurin, Billigkeitserwiignungen griechischer Beamter im ptolemi'schen Aegypten,
ill PROCEEDINGS OF THE XHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PAPYROLOGY, UNWVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN 309 (D. Samuel ed. 1970).
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serve archaic conditions, methods, and modes of legal thinking at a
stage inaccessible to the Romanist except by extrapolating from later
developments. I cannot do more than mention this opportunity, which
so far has not been exploited to the extent it deserves. It is hardly
necessary to emphasize the importance of this opportunity as one of
the avenues leading to the very roots and beginnings of the methods
of tackling social problems by legal means.
Even more important, however, is another opportunity offered to the
Greek legal historian by the very nature of his material. It lies in the
fact, unparalled as it seems, that the daily application of legal princi-
ples in the Greek city-states and Hellenistic monarchies rested on a har-
monious combination of archaic forms of legal thinking, never fully ar-
ticulated and therefore never quite shedding their primitive character,
and an advanced legal technique that was perfectly capable of satisfy-
ing the social and economic needs of the day. In Athens, this tech-
nique centered in a somewhat rigid, but well-ordered system of courts
and procedure; in the Hellenistic states and in Roman times, it was the
draftsmen whose inventiveness and ability to devise schemes for compli-
cated transactions surpassed the talents of even their Roman contempo-
raries. 1 If I am not mistaken, it was this dialectical relationship be-
tween primitive, and, in fact, only half-realized, dogmatic concepts and
a sophisticated technique that enabled those draftsmen occasionally to
bring about results that the much more learned, but less naive, Roman
jurists at best achieved less perfectly and with difficulty.
An instructive instance of this is the way in which Greek draftsmen
in Egypt made possible the assignment of claims and contracts giving
third parties a right to bring suit in their own name against the debtor,
transactions not admitted under Roman law. This was by no means
due to an unprincipled, thoughtless yielding to what happened to be
the economic interests of certain people. It rested, to the contrary,
on the time-honored notion that the relationship between creditor and
debtor was not merely, as it was under Roman law, a vinculum iuris,
that is, a purely personal bond tying the debtor to the creditor and
only the creditor, but was a kind of dominion, similar to that over ob-
jects, which entitled the creditor to seize the property, and, in some
cases, the person, of the defaulting debtor and which, like any other
dominion, could be freely turned over to somebody else.
11. Cf. F. PRINGSHEIM, THE GREEK LAW OF SALE 501 ff. (1950).
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From the standpoint of general legal theory this instance is interest-
ing. It shows that the ancient idea of liability in the primitive sense
of submission to possible seizure by the creditor still determined the
treatment of the problem in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, notwith-
standing that at that time the economic purpose of the contract-to pro-
vide the creditor with a claim to performance of the debtor's promise-
had long penetrated the consciousness of the people. It would be
easy to prove this from the sources.
This discrepancy between the legal and the sociological situations was
real, not merely theoretical. Another consequence will make this
clear. Contractual liability, in the last analysis, resulted from the tort
of frustrating the creditor's expense, thereby causing him concrete
damage in the form of a real loss to his fortune.12  Consequently, it
was only at a late stage, if ever, that Greco-Egyptian draftsmen found
a way to make the debtor responsible for the merely hypothetical dam-
age suffered by the creditor through the frustration of gainful dealings
that would have been possible to him had the debtor fulfilled his obli-
gation. As is well known, the English law did not achieve this progress
before the famous Slade's Case of 1602.13
The phenomenon just mentioned has a bearing upon the philosophi-
cal question of the mutual relationship of economic and sociological de-
sirability, on the one hand, and juridical dogma, on the other, as factors
operative in legal progress. It illustrates how sometimes the latter may
be the determining element; the force of established legal notions may
be strong enough to counteract the tendency toward the unfettered
creation of ad hoc legal devices inconsistent with the basic spirit of the
system. I should like to emphasize that the jurisprudential import of
this fact is enhanced rather than diminished by the Greek legal techni-
cian's use of accepted tenets to bring about novel results in ways that
helped them to get around doctrinal barriers that their legal conscience
did not allow them simply to jump. Unfortunately time does not per-
mit me to elaborate on this highly interesting aspect, which was first
discovered and described by Ernst Rabel. 14 I have to confine myself
to only one instance, the sale on credit: the Greeks obtained its prac-
12. The Greek name for this tort is blabe.
13. 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602).
14. This was the subject of a famous comparative investigation, Rabel, Nachge-
lormte Rechtsgeschiifte (pts. I & 2), 27 ZErrscmUrT DER SAVIGNY-STFTUNG FOR RErCTS-
oaacmcrr, RoMANmisCHE ABTmLtmlo 290 (1906), 28 id. at 311 (1907), reprinted in
4 E. RABEL, GEsAMMELTE AuFSXTZE 9 (1971).
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tical effect by combining a contract of sale-its traditional character,
necessarily a cash transaction, was never altered-with an agreement
that the buyer owed the price as a loan received from the seller.
Seemingly a fiction, in reality this scheme was a consequence of the
rationale that, because the exchange had already taken place, the
money was considered as already belonging to the seller.
V
Let me now suggest a second set of problems. They, too, concern the
relationship between the law and its social, economic, and political
background, but they do so in a sense opposite to the one just con-
sidered. The cases just observed serve as illustrations of the conflict
and possible reconciliation between traditional legal notions and chang-
ing conditions of life. They exemplify the situation, not infrequent in
ancient Greek law, in which the conflict presented itself as a dialectical
play of action and counteraction, characterized by the reality that fund-
amental concepts that might be modified, but could never be aban-
doned, were, in the last analysis, the determining factors in forming
the legal devices required by society. The facts to which we now turn
will show the opposite phenomenon: the shaping of legal formations
in accordance with the needs, and adapted to the specific character,
of the social and political setting that they were destined to regulate.
The family lends itself to the study of this problem more readily than
does any other institution. How and to what extent does the legal or-
ganization of the family reflect the sociological character and the po-
litical order of the society to whose integration its contributes? An-
cient Greek and Hellenistic history knew various types of society,
widely differing from one another, and it seems that this resulted in
different forms of domestic order, especially regarding the status and
capacity of women. Two examples will be useful.
In classical Athens the oikos or "house," as the family of the individ-
ual citizen was called, was a patriarchally governed unit, based prin-
cipally on descent (although adoption was permitted and extensively
practiced) and held together by religious ties. Legitimate birth into
an oikos was, except for naturalization, an indispensable condition of
citizenship (even the validity of an adoption depended on the adoptee's
legitimate birth into another citizen's family). An adult son might
separate from the house of his father and set up his own oikos. Until
then, however, he had only an immaterial share in the family property,
[Vol. 1975:395
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which was managed by the father of the house. A woman had no
share of her own and was subject to the power (kyrieia) of her father
or husband, respectively, the primary manifestation of which was the
kyrios' right, through the performance of certain prescribed formalities,
to give the woman in legitimate marriage to another citizen. When
the father of the house died, his sons become the kyrioi of their unmar-
ried sisters. Upon the father's death, his estate fell to his sons, who
divided it among themselves; in the absence of sons it fell to collaterals,
unless the father had adopted an heir by will. Testate succession was
possible only in the absence of sons, and women could not personally
succeed. A brotherless daughter was called an epikleros, the literal
meaning of which is "on the kleros" (estate). The expression "heir-
ess", used by modem authors, is really a misnomer, for she did not,
at least strictly speaking, inherit anything, but served only as an inter-
mediary. Her sons became heirs of their maternal grandfather when
they became of age, thus, in a way, securing the continuance of their
grandfather's oikos. An epikleros who had no son might be claimed
into marriage by her father's nearest agnate, who then became the
kyrios of the estate until a son, born to him and the epikleros, reached
maturity. The agnate's right extended to the point that he might even
break up an existing previous marriage of the epikleros.
Together with some other features, which I have omitted, the whole
system was designed to perpetuate the existence of the oikoi as long
as possible and, as far as possible, to prevent family estates from falling
into the hands of other families. The oikoi in their totality formed the
foundation on which the polis (city-state) as a religio-political com-
munity rested. Even in the democratic period, the citizenry-actually
only a relatively small fraction of the total population-sought, at least
fictitiously, to maintain the principle that it was a body united by com-
mon descent-perhaps a remnant of a remote tribal past. This is why
the system, including its rather inhuman features, such as the law of
the epikleros, persisted into the fourth century B.C., and possibly even
beyond. By that time, its original connection with the religio-political
order was no longer understood by the Athenians themselves, as can
be seen in the comedies of the late fourth century playwright Menan-
dros.
I have given this somewhat detailed description of the Athenian
system because it shows in an exemplary fashion how closely legal insti-
tutions may be tied to their socio-religious preconditions. This fact
Vol. 1975:395] 405
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receives additional weight in the light of recent research, which has es-
tablished that the Athenian system was not at all common to all Greeks.
The best-known of other systems, and, at the same time, one that
represents, in an equally exemplary fashion, a totally different type, is
the one now being uncovered in the Greek papyri of Egypt.
If we disregard, as I must do here, a few Greek poleis (Naucratis,
Alexandria, Ptolemais), the nucleus of the Greek-speaking population
of Ptolemaic Egypt15 were men who had come into the country as
members of the armies of Alexander the Great or the first Ptolemy.1"
They were joined later by others, most of whom also had entered the
service of the kings. Each of the men came as an individual. What
held them together-apart from a certain pride of being Greek, which,
however, created no more than a psychological bond-was their com-
mon loyalty to the king. Those who had come from Hellenic poleis,
and for a while even their descendants, maintained a theoretical al-
legiance to their places of origin, but for all practical purposes the ties
were broken.
The result was an individualistic society that had little in common
with the old polis society. The old Greek cults, inseparably tied to
the closely knit social organism integrated into each polis, gave way to
new, universal religions, chiefly the one centering around the god Sara-
pis. Accordingly, the place of the oikos was taken by a more modem
kind of family, consisting of a father, mother, and children, and resting
on the personal relationship of its members, but no longer understood
as a religio-political unit. Consequently, only remnants of the old fam-
ily law survived. The kyrieia over women was changed into a mere
guardianship; this, as it seems, occurred for no reason other than a doc-
trinaire attitude of the Ptolemaic government, which thoughtlessly
clung to traditional patterns. In at least some other places, such as the
Kingdom of the Seleucids in Syria, the obsolete institution was dropped.
Women were capable of owning and disposing of property; they could
inherit and leave their estates to heirs of their choice, as could men.
The institution of marriage was relieved of its function as a means of
preserving the oikoi. Its conclusion was no longer a solemn transaction
between the kyrios of the bride and the young husband or his father,
dependent on the observation of certain formalities, but could be
achieved by an informal union of the couple. There were no more
15. Late fourth through first centuries B.C.
16. One of Alexander's generals, who made himself king of Egypt
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bans on intermarriage with persons of different origin, such as, for in-
stance, had been a feature of the democratic law of Athens. Divorce
was free and could be obtained by either spouse simply by severing
the relationship. Particularly interesting, for all that appears, is that,
at least in Egypt, most or all of these changes did not come about
by legislation, but by a slow and gradual dropping-of old customs that
appeared obsolete and senseless.
The Athenian and the Ptolemaic types of family organization are two
well-documented illustrations, which we are fortunate to. possess, of the
opportunities offered by Greek legal history for the study of the inter-
dependence of the law and its socio-political background. Actually,
the sources, especially the inscriptions on stone from all parts of the
Greek world, leave no doubt that there were more and still different
types. Time limits, but even more the hitherto limited exploration of
these sources, prevent me from giving you a detailed account. Suffice
it to mention two significant features. The law of the Cretan city of
Gortyn, known to us from a gigantic inscription of the fifth century B.C.
containing the bulk of the statutory law of that city, does not seem
to have known an Athenian-type kyrieia over women, although women
were to some extent subject to the head of the family there, too. The
status of women in Delphi and other states of Central Greece seems
also to have been freer than in Athens, if some manumission deeds,
executed by or in cooperation with women, and preserved in inscrip-
tions from Delphi, give the correct impression. Although this is just
an impresson that needs to be checked, it looks to me as though the
family in the peasant areas of Central Greece was organized rather
more along the lines of a community giving equal rights to all its mem-
bers, including women, than along the lines of the patriarchal oikos.
There is still a wide and promising field of research open, if and when
legal study of the inscriptions, still in its infancy, gains momentum.
VI
I have been trying to show, with a few examples, at which points
and in what ways the study of Greek legal history can help us in our
efforts to gain a deeper insight into the workings and the function of
law in general. I could expand this survey indefinitely, referring to
a variety of problems of a more general character that might even
arouse the interest of the nonspecialist. This would be particularly true,
I think, of certain areas of both substantive and adjective law in which
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the Greek approach shows a remarkable similarity to early English law.
I mentioned the Greek concept of contractual liability, and I should
like to add that it is in some ways comparable, if I am not mistaken,
to the idea underlying the action of trespass on the case. Unfortu-
nately there is no time now to elaborate.' 7 If I have succeeded in con-
vincing some of you that research into the history of Greek law can
be conducted in a way that entitles it to a place among the various legal
sciences, I have reached my goal.
17. See Wolff, Debt and Assumpsit in the Light of Comparative Legal History, 1
THE IRISH JuisT 316 (1966), reprinted in H.J. WOLFF, OPUSCULA DISPERSA 123-34
(1974).
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